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BOOK REVIEW
DEATH IS THE NIOTHER OF METAPHOR
THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY.
By Thomas C. Grey.1 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. I99I.
Pp. 155. $24.95.
Reviewed by Steven L. Winter 2
[O]ne is not a lawyer one minute and a poet the next .... I don't
have a separate mind for legal work and another for writing poetry. I
do each with my whole mind ....
WALLACE STEVENS
3
I. LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY?
Should lawyers and legal scholars study the poetry of Wallace
Stevens? The New York Times did not think much of the idea,4 and
one shudders to think what the Wall Street Journal would have said.
Professor Grey has written a stimulating and intellectually adventur-
ous book examining the question. But his assessment is ambivalent.
Grey admits that for him, the "urges both to sharpen and to blur (or
cross) the genre-boundary between law and poetry coexist" (p. 4) and
describes his inquiry as "a most far-fetched and unpredictable venture"
(p. 9). It is not surprising, then, that he concludes the venture on a
very diffident note: "if the poet Stevens speaks to lawyers, it is to
teach us pragmatist philosophy" (p. io3). s
In evaluating his project, Grey first considers and then rejects the
two most common justifications for the law-and-literature endeavor.
Some of the legal literati argue that lawyers should study literature
I Nelson Bowman Sweitzer and Marie B. Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
2 Professor, University of Miami School of Law. Bruce Ackerman, Tom Grey, Pat Gudridge,
Mark Johnson, Pierre Schlag, Steve Schnably, Peter Schuck, and Lynn Winter provided helpful
comments and suggestions. I am indebted to all of them, but especially to Tom Grey for his
encouragement and to Bruce Ackerman for his unflagging support.
3 Letter from Wallace Stevens to Harvey Breit (July 29, 1942), in LETTERS OF WALLACE
STEVENS 413, 413-14 (Holly Stevens ed., 1972).
4 See David Margolick, At the Bar: In Search of Wallace Stevens, a Poet-Lawyer (Lawyer-
Poet?) Prized for His Very Ambiguity, N.Y. TIES, July 12, 199i, at B7.
Grey's colleague, Margaret Jane Radin - though, perhaps, equally self-conscious about
crossing genre-lines - is more confident about the usefulness of Stevens's poetry in teaching
law. See Margaret Jane Radin, "After the Final No, There Comes a Yes": A Law Teacher's
Report, 2 XYALE J.L. & HuMAN. 253, 266 (i99o).
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because it can help develop and hone a capacity for empathy - what
Grey calls "the equitable virtue of fellow-feeling" (p. 8). But, Grey
notes, Stevens's poems are rarely about people (p. 27). "Stevens's
poetry came from his life, and throughout that life he inhabited an
'unpeopled' world of vividly experienced places and objects . . ." (p.
24). Indeed, Stevens's world was one "[w]here the wild poem is a
substitute / For the woman one loves or ought to love . ... 6
Stevens's poetry may teach many things, but Grey concludes that
empathy is not one of them.
Law-and-literature proponents also stress the discursive, rhetorical,
and ideological dimensions of legal practice (pp. 37-40). It follows
that "we lawyers should be able to learn something useful from poets,
those ultimate specialists in language, about our own inescapably
linguistic business" (p. 4). Grey feels the pull of this position, but he
rejects it as a-reason for lawyers to read Wallace Stevens. Here, Grey
invokes an oddly originalist view. 7 He argues that the "intellectual
integration" extolled by law-and-literature advocates 8 is inconsistent
with Stevens's own practice and understanding (p. 41). Grey traces
the stark separation that Stevens maintained between his poetry and
his workaday world of insurance claims, surety law, and sharp, clear
prose (pp. 41-51). It is as if Wallace Stevens had read Judge Posner
and taken him to heart, 9 and as if that were reason enough for us to
do likewise.
Grey nevertheless concludes that lawyers can profit from the study
of Stevens's poetry. Lawyers, he explains, are prone to "the habitual
and institutional rigidities of binary thought" (p. 7). In court, judg-
ment must lie for plaintiff or defendant. In interpreting a legal rule,
the purpose is to determine coverage or exclusion - either the rule
applies or it does not. In analyzing legal doctrine, the goal is theo-
retical consistency and integrity - either the principle explains all the
cases or it is indeterminate. As Grey pointedly observes (and as some
of us have elaborated previously),' 0 "[1]egal theory is too often char-
6 WALLACE STEVENS, Arrival at the Waldorf, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE
STEVENS 240, 241 (1954) [hereinafter THE COLLECTED POEMS].
7 Cf. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
706 (1975) (rejecting a purely originalist model of constitutional interpretation).
8 See JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 19 (1990) (explaining that intellectual
integration consists of "a bringing to consciousness of the nature of our own intellectual and
linguistic practices, both literary and legal, with the hope of holding them in the mind at once
in such a way as to change our sense of both.").
9 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 357 (1988)
(concluding that, in spite of what each has to offer the other, law and literature are best
preserved as separate disciplines).
10 See Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1107-13, 1117-29, 1196-98 (1989); see also STANLEY
FISH, Anti-Professionalism, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
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acterized by absolutists and disappointed absolutists shouting past
each other" (p. 6). As therapy for this affliction, Grey prescribes the
pragmatist lessons that he so ably draws from the poetry of Wallace
Stevens (p. 7).
Grey's book is thoughtful, engaging, even courageous. By forging
philosophical links between the concerns of poetry and those of law,
Grey has performed an important intellectual service for a discipline
that remains surprisingly parochial despite the seeming proliferation
of its "law-and-" subgenres.11 Moreover, Grey is correct about both
the binary and absolutist tendencies of most legal theory and the
potential usefulness of Stevens's poetry as an antidote. The problem,
however, is that Grey is ultimately unable to deliver the promised
therapy. As a pragmatist, Grey is committed to the view that every
discourse is a function of conventions and understandings specific to
that particular practice. 12 This commitment leaves Grey with no way
to escape the tradition and practices - his tradition and practices -
that he seeks to edify with his pragmatist insights. 13 Grey's own
analysis remains afflicted by the residual binarism that he decries. 14
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 215, 244-46 (1989) (arguing that
the antiprofessionalist is a disappointed professionalist).
11 For an insightful explanation of how and why legal theorists manage to assimilate other
disciplines in a denatured, legalized form, see Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi" -
The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, II CARDOzO L. REv. 1631,
1651-57 (1990).
12 For pragmatists, a "normal discourse" such as the law entails "the practice of solving
problems against the background of consensus about what counts as a good explanation of the
phenomena and about what it would take for a problem to be solved." RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 320 (1979). Thus, at the close of his book, Grey
reminds the reader that pragmatists must accede to "the limits imposed by the local and situated
character of all theorizing" (p. iio). Grey has elsewhere explained that the pragmatists "treated
thinking as contextual and situated; it came always embodied in practices - habits and patterns
of perceiving and conceiving that had developed out of and served to guide activity." Thomas
C. Grey, Hohnes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 798 (1989).
13 See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1627, 1708-21 (1991)
(demonstrating this conflict within Grey's pragmatism). As I have argued previously, this is a
common problem for pragmatists. Pragmatists recognize that categories, words and the like do
not fit the world, but rather are tools of interaction with it. Nevertheless, they make the mistake
of continuing to conceptualize those "tools" in the same way that their objectivist predecessors
did when they thought of words and the like as actually fitting the world. See Steven L.
Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 657-64 (199o) (showing
how this error undermines Stanley Fish's critique of theory and self-consciousness); Winter,
supra note xo, at 1123-26 (discussing the conflict between Rorty's philosophy of language and
his account of a normal discourse as a practice within which "[r]igorous argumentation issues
in agreement in propositions"). As a result, the pragmatist risks a problem analogous to the
concern voiced by some feminists - that it may be difficult to dismantle the master's house
with the master's own tools. See AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the
Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 110, 110-13 (1984).
14 Much the same is true for Stevens, although some aspects of his work suggest an alter-
native that he never quite assimilated. See infra pp. 752-53, 760-62.
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Consider Grey's initial question. To ask whether Stevens's poetry
should be part of the legal canon is already to presuppose a categorical
distinction between law and literature that, as a conceptual matter,
we might not wish to concede. 15 This distinction is natural enough
for those steeped in the Enlightenment tradition that privileges the
objective over the subjective, the literal over the metaphoric, and the
rational over the imaginative. But Grey's whole claim is that Stevens's
poetry should serve as pragmatic therapy for this tendency toward
dichotomization. It is curious, therefore, to find the traditional anti-
nomies reappearing throughout Grey's book. Grey admits at the start
that he feels "the stylistic appeal of generic integrity; law is law, poetry
is poetry" (p. 3). So too, he concludes on a surprisingly objectivist
note: "Jurisprudence is not the same as poetics . . . Law is poetry
is indeed only a metaphor . . ." (p. iio).16  The tipoff to Grey's
residual objectivism is the word "only" - as if, by virtue of its
metaphorical quality, the similarity between law and poetry were
somehow less than real.
In contrast, I claim that, despite even obvious differences in their
appearance, law and poetry are surprisingly comparable products of
a common human cognition. 17 For that one moment preserved in the
epigraph, Stevens was right: we do not have separate minds for poetry
and for law. Necessarily, we do each with the same mind - indeed,
the whole mind. That mind is an embodied process that is irreducibly
imaginative and metaphoric. 18 There is no difference in kind between
the rigors of "reason" and the demands of poetry.
As just one example, consider Grey's description of the pleasures
of reason: "Both deduction and clear vision are naturally felt as cold,
linear, satisfying in their impersonality" (p. 92). This statement strikes
all the chords of the Enlightenment conception of Reason as a disem-
bodied faculty that is rigorous, linear, cool, and unemotional. Yet on
Is As Milner Ball points out, the "and" in "'Law and Literature' gives too much away as
though law is discrete . . . as though we are exploring an equivocal, analogical relation
(similarities between two admittedly different things, law and literature) rather than a univocal,
metaphorical relation." Milner S. Ball, Confessions, I CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. xSs, 188
(1989).
16 Grey then quotes Stevens's own ambivalent advice that there are "'things beyond resem-
blance,"' although between them remain "'this and that intended to be recognized"' (pp. n1o-
ix (quoting WALLACE STEVENS, Prologues to What Is Possible, in THE COLLECTED POEMS,
supra note 6, at 515, 516)).
17 Cf. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1597, i658 (ix'i) (drawing instructive parallels between the worlds of music and
law).
Is My entire difference with Grey is epitomized by a casual parenthetical late in the book
that distinguishes between "rational analogy" and "imagistic association" (p. 93). Recent devel-
opments in cognitive theory show that human rationality is a matter of imagistic association; it
is precisely in that sense that rationality is imaginative. See Steven L. Winter, Contingency
and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 963, 992-95 (1991).
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a second look, this statement proclaims - and is an instantiation of
- the metaphorical quality of reason: reason is cold; it is rigorous; it
is linear; it is clear; it is felt. Indeed, in its dependence on embodied
experiences like temperature and rigor, 19 the metaphorical quality of
reason is anything but detached and impersonal.
As Grey suggests, the poetry of Wallace Stevens is of special
relevance because of his particular concern with metaphor. "The
possibility of imaginative (metaphoric) integration remained at the
heart both of [Stevens's] secular religion and his account of daily life"
(p. 78). A great deal of what Stevens had to say about metaphor is
relevant to philosophic questions central to our understanding of the
law. Despite our lofty ambitions, it is becoming increasingly obvious
that our objectivist tools are unequal to the task of mastering the
uncertainty and complexity of the human experience that we seek to
regulate. To manage better, we first need to rediscover human reason
in all its imaginative capacity. We must learn to appreciate and use
what Stevens calls the "disposition to metaphor"20 if we are to have
"humane law within the limits of human imagination." 21 Or, as Ste-
vens puts it:
To say more than human things with human voice,
That cannot be; to say human things with more
Than human voice, that, also, cannot be;
To speak humanly from the height or from the depth
Of human things, that is acutest speech. 22
II. EITHER/OR
Much of Grey's book is organized around the set of familiar op-
positions between law and literature, prose and poetry, the literal and
the metaphoric, reality and imagination, even law and equity. Locke
insisted upon literal prose "if we would speak of Things as they are,"
and he condemned metaphor and other figurative speech as "perfect
cheat. 23 In contrast, the tradition that derives from Nietzsche accepts
the distinction but valorizes metaphor as prior to and more basic than
19 As Grey reminds us, Locke thought of Reason as male (pp. 36-37). The word "rigor"
comes from the Latin rigere, which means "to be stiff." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1657 (2d ed. unabridged 1987). Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent
etymologies and definitions are from this source.
20 WALLACE STEVENS, A Collect of Philosophy, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS 267, 269 (rev. ed.,
Milton J. Bates ed., 1989).
21 Winter, supra note io, at 1113, 1233-34.
22 WALLACE STEVENS, Choco-ta to Its Neighbors, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra note
6, at 296, 300.
23 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 508 (bk. 3, ch. 0)
(Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975).
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literal speech. This view understands the literal as merely "worn out
metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses. '2 4 "Old
metaphors," Richard Rorty claims, "are constantly dying off into lit-
eralness, and then serving as a platform and foil for new metaphors." 25
On this view, "[tiruth" is the product of the "strong poet" who creates
the metaphors that succeed by dying. 26 "A sense of human history as
the history of successive metaphors would let us see the poet, in the
generic sense of the maker of new words, the shaper of new languages,
as the vanguard of the species."2 7 This is the Romantic's triumph
over Enlightenment rationality in which, as Shelley claimed, "[p]oets
are the unacknowledged legislators of the world. 28
Although Grey identifies Stevens with the Romantic side of this
divide (p. 7), he highlights the conflicted nature of Stevens's thinking
about metaphor:
[T]he relation of metaphor to reality [was] a topic of abiding interest
to Stevens. As well as being a suspicious critic of this "evasive" trope,
he also joined in the Romantic celebration of what Shelley called
poetry's "vitally metaphoric" power to carry its readers to a new
revelation of an ever-changing reality (p. 6i).
Grey underscores this conflict by starting the chapter with a double
epigraph. He juxtaposes Stevens's aphorism, "Reality is a clich6 from
which we escape by metaphor," 29 with a stanza from Credences of
Summer, in which Stevens expresses his desire to seek the center
"[w]ithout evasion by a single metaphor" 30 (p. 52).
Grey examines Stevens's conflict through a series of thoughtful
readings of his poem The Motive for Metaphor. In its entirety, the
poems reads:
You like it under the trees in autumn,
Because everything is half dead.
The wind moves like a cripple among the leaves
And repeats words without meaning.
In the same way, you were happy in spring,
With the half colors of quarter-things,
The slightly brighter sky, the melting clouds,
The single bird, the obscure moon -
24 2 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense, in EARLY
GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 173, 18o (Oscar Levy ed. & Maximilian A. Miigge
trans., 1964).
25 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY x6 (1989). At times, Grey
explicitly identifies Stevens with this position (pp. 39-40, 78).
26 RORTY, supra note 25, at 20.
27 Id.
28 PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, A DEFENSE OF POETRY 8o (John E. Jordan ed., 1965).
29 WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 20, at 184, 204.
30 WALLACE STEVENS, Credences of Summer, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 6, at
372, 373.
[VOL. 105:745
BOOK REVIEW
The obscure moon lighting an obscure world
Of things that would never be expressed,
Where you yourself were never quite yourself
And did not want nor have to be,
Desiring the exhilarations of changes:
The motive for metaphor, shrinking from
The weight of primary noon,
The A B C of being,
The ruddy temper, the hammer
Of red and blue, the hard sound -
Steel against intimation - the sharp flash,
The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X.3 1
Grey begins with an account of Professor Radin's reading of the
poem at the 1989 annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools (pp. 52-53). Radin suggested:
[O]ne "motive for metaphor" is the legal humanist's desire for "the
exhilarations of changes" - the excitement of transmuting the base
metal of law's crude raw material into art. The darker, autumnal
side of this motive is its "shrinking" from law's noontime realities of
prisons and money, pain and greed, into the more sheltered domain
of texts, tropes and dialogue. The civilized view of law as cultured
conversation unduly neglects the "hard sound" of "steel against inti-
mation," the sound of force against eloquence, sharp blades against
the soft flesh of human bodies that, more than any words, should be
the lawyer's first concern. On this reading, "The Motive for Meta-
phor" cleanly separates - as Stevens did in his life, and as Judge
Posner tells us we should do in our legal scholarship - the realms of
poetry and law . .. (pp. 58-59).
Radin has since explained that she now uses The Motive for Metaphor
"to consider when and how metaphor might be objectionable." 3 2
"Sometimes," she observes, "the obscurity of metaphor provides com-
fort to oppression. '3 3 But, she concedes, "only situated judgment can
tell us when. ' '3 4
Although Grey accepts this reading, he finds the poem more nu-
anced and more complicated; it doubles back on itself and "partly
undoes what it did" (p. 59). He notes "the poem's turn in the final
stanzas toward metaphor, the obscure, the transitory, where we were
led to expect the literal, clear, and stable" (p. 6o). Grey suggests that
the motive for metaphor may be not escape, but expression: "Meta-
'" WALLACE STEVENS, The Motive for Metaphor, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra note
6, at 288.
32 Radin, supra note 5, at 262. Later in her piece, Radin appears to soften her earlier
reading of the poem with its "hard" dichotomization of law and literature. Id. at 265.
33 Id. at 262.
34 Id.
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phor, then may shrink from midday sunlight toward reality as well
as away from it; . . . the poem [offers] both possibilities at once" (p.
63). From this he extrapolates that the lawyer's purpose in reading
the poem should be
to wrestle with the poem's antitheses and then to find that after the
struggle has gone as far as it practically can, there remains the sense
- which should likewise always hover over the reduction of a living
dispute to a case at law - that not everything has been said, that
representation in every respect has been partial and incomplete.
... Poetry, especially Stevens's kind of poetry, reminds the reader
that the bright obvious is not everything; that something, which may
be the most important thing, always remains obscure; that a principle,
a moral of the story, always carries its own implicit qualification (p.
66).
I admire this account and find much with which to agree. But I
remain dissatisfied. It continues to rely upon the traditional dichotom-
ization of the discursive world: there is "metaphor, the obscure, the
transitory," and then there is "the literal, clear, and stable"; metaphor
may take us "toward reality as well as away from it" (pp. 60-63).
True, the account presses beyond thesis and antithesis and enjoins us
to read dialectically. But "[t]his dialectic doesn't go anywhere. It is
an arrested dialectic: There is no moment of synthesis." 35 Indeed,
Grey tells us that "Stevens does not regard the dualism of matter and
mind, reality and imagination, as some easily discarded bit of philo-
sophical entrepreneurship" (p. 77). Rather,
Stevens sees the perspectival incompleteness of realism and idealism,
but he also sees that even when these perspectives are recognized as
limited, they will nevertheless survive the transcending moment of
recognition. After the dialectical moment, dissolving . . . the literal
and metaphoric into one another, the idealist will reassert metaphor's
vital superiority to lifeless literality, whereas the realist will again urge
that the clarity of the literal should prevail against metaphoric evasion
and obscurity (p. 73).
In the end, Grey's "pragmatic middle way" (p. 1io) leaves us precisely
where we began.
Despite the admonition to wrestle with the antitheses, Grey's di-
chotomous presuppositions exact their inevitable cost; the logic of
opposites is that of contradiction and negation and not that of quali-
fication or reconciliation. As long as we follow the residual objectivist
practice of defining concepts oppositionally - that is, in terms of the
properties that are present or absent (P and not-P) - we will continue
to be confronted by the stubborn inadequacy of such crude, two-
35 Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383 (1985).
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dimensional accounts. 36 Something will always remains obscure, un-
said - partial and incomplete.
Sometimes it is right to hold in mind that the early bird catches the
worm; sometimes, that all work and no play make Jack a dull boy.
Hobbes's maxim that in politics clubs are trumps and Hume's that
opinion rules the world stand in a similar relation, as do principles
proclaiming the centrality of rules and of equitable discretion in legal
judgment. To say this kind of thing (as James and Stevens so readily
do) is not to embrace unreason or deny the Law of
Contradiction. . . . [I]n cases where general beliefs conflict, it leaves
the decision to judgment (or "perception" as Aristotle put it) rather
than to computation (pp. 84-85).
For Grey, as for Radin, complexity yields to obscurity, which in turn
must be deferred to the mysterious faculty of "judgment."
Yet perhaps the fault is not Grey's, but Stevens's. In his poetry,
Stevens worked through his ambivalence toward the Enlightenment
categories of the real and the metaphoric until he could go no further.
His view of metaphor as simultaneously an "evasion" and "revelation"
of "reality"37 yields not a mature acceptance of incompleteness, but
an epochi - the suspension or cessation of thought that is the ultimate
product of contradiction and negation:
The nothingness was a nakedness, a point
Beyond which thought could not progress as thought.
He had to choose. But it was not a choice
Between excluding things. It was not a choice
Between, but of.38
III. A DEMISE GREATLY EXAGGERATED
Cognitive theory's claim for the importance of metaphor is not a
naive oppositionalism that inverts the binary schema of the Enlight-
enment to exalt the poet over the scientist or legislator. Rather than
the creation of particular genius, metaphor turns out to be part of the
common, imaginative core of human rationality.
The empirical evidence from linguistic history (the diachronic) and
contemporary language use (the synchronic) suggests not only the
ubiquity, but also the continuity of metaphor. For example, consider
-6 For examinations of the conceptual and empirical inadequacies of this approach to cate-
gories and concepts, see Winter, supra note io, at r124-25 n.69, 1148-56; and Winter, supra
note 13, at 657-64.
37 See supra p. 750.
38 WALLACE STEVENS, Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, sugpra
note 6, at 380, 403.
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the word "perception." The Latin capere means "to take," as in the
common law writ of capias, which authorized seizure of the defendant.
Percipere, a compound derivation, means "to lay hold of." This is
the source of the verb "perceive," which encompasses both sensory
processes such as seeing and intellectual processes such as understand-
ing.
Most speakers of ordinary English are not aware of this etymology.
For them, "perceive" has a "literal" meaning that corresponds with
understand. Today, "perceptive" more likely connotes keen insight
and understanding than good vision or acute tactile sense. In apparent
consistency with the Nietzschean view, the word "perceive" is prem-
ised on a "dead" metaphor that equates the cognitive operation of
knowing with the physical process of holding. Or so it seems.
There are, however, many words premised on the same "dead"
metaphor. A lawyer may scrutinize a document or examine a witness,
but the Latin sources scrutari and ex agmen mean to "pick through
trash" and to "pull out from a row," respectively. 39 The word "met-
aphor" itself derives from the Greek meta pherein, which means "to
carry over." As Grey points out, "metaphor is the figure of movement,
of carrying across, of transport (you can ride a literal metaphora, the
public bus, in Athens today)" (p. 61). A metaphor "carries over" a
meaning from one context to another.
The etymologies of apparently unrelated words such as "perceive,"
"scrutinize," "examine," and "metaphor" share the same metaphoric
infrastructure: a concept or idea is treated as an object subject to
physical manipulation and transportation; words are vehicles for con-
veying this ideational "content"; the resulting cognitive operation is
understood as an acquisition or "taking in" of that object. These
conceptions can be represented by the following metaphors: Ideas Are
Objects; Words Are Containers; Communication Is Sending; Under-
standing Is Grasping; and The Mind Is a Container.40 Thus, "literal"
expressions such as perceive and scrutinize are not separate etymolog-
ical products of individual "dead" metaphors. Rather, they are part
of an entire metaphoric system - sometimes referred to as the Conduit
metaphor 41 - in which the domain of physical manipulation is the
source of metaphors for operations in the intellectual domain.
At first blush, the systematicity of these metaphors does not trouble
the Nietzschean view. Entire metaphoric systems can die, too. But
39 EVE SIVEETSER, FROM ETYMOLOGY TO PRAGMATICS: METAPHORICAL AND CULTURAL
ASPECTS OF SEMANTIC STRUCTURE 32 (190).
40 Related metaphors include Knowing Is Seeing and Intellectual Investigation Is Explora-
tion.
41 See Michael J. Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor - A Case of Frame Conflict in Our
Language About Language, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 284, 286-92 (Andrew Ortony ed.,
1979). But see SWEETSER, supra note 39, at 28-32 (relating this system to the more extensive
Mind-As-Body metaphor).
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once we know what to look for, investigation (from the Latin inves-
tigare - "to follow a trail") reveals that this metaphoric system is
very much alive in contemporary English. This metaphoric system is
what allows us to comprehend (from the Latin com + prehendre -
"to grasp together") a highly conventional passage such as the follow-
ing:
The professor delivered a superb lecture, but only the exceptional
students were able to take it all in. The less gifted students had to
struggle before they grasped the point. It takes more to master a
concept than to assimilate a piece of information.
These expressions cannot be accounted for as products of a "dead"
metaphoric system, because each of these words - "deliver," "take,"
"struggle," "grasp," and so on - retains its meaning in the domain of
physical activity. We can try to save the "dead" metaphor view by
explaining these expressions as cases of polsyemy, in which the same
word has developed different meanings and uses. This characteriza-
tion, however, ignores the systematic connections between the poly-
semous meanings. Each of these cases of synchronic polysemy is
enabled by (that is, it works because of) the Conduit metaphor - the
same metaphoric system responsible for the diachronic semantic de-
velopment of words such as "perceive." Linguistic history is not the
history of successive metaphors, but rather of recurrent metaphor.
Words are not concepts. 42 The persistence of the Conduit meta-
phor system is not merely a matter of consistent historical usage of
particular words or phrases. The synchronic vitality of these meta-
phors demonstrates that they are part of our conceptual system. Thus,
any word that signifies physical acquisition can come to signify intel-
lectual understanding: I can "get" your point, "catch" your drift, "field"
questions, "wrench" a point out of context, or "wrestle" with a difficult
concept. Each of these cases of polysemy - in which words that
signify physical possession can also connote knowing - depends upon
the conceptual metaphor Understanding Is Grasping. Moreover, these
underlying conceptual metaphors enable a speaker automatically to
extend the system by modelling other actions in the physical domain:
one can "discard" faulty assumptions, "save up" good arguments for
later use, "dig up" a case on point, or "cram" for an exam (unless one
is an "airhead"). So too, Stevens can employ the conventional Ideas
Are Objects metaphor in exquisite poetic formulations. He declares
that "everything we say . . . [is] a cast / Of the imagination, made in
42 Cf. WALLACE STEVENS, Description Without Place, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra
note 6, at 339, 345 ("Thus the theory of description matters most. / It is the theory of the word
for those / For whom the word is the making of the world . . ").
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sound"43 and that "[tihe poem is the cry of its occasion, / Part of the
res itself and not about it."4 4
These examples illustrate that the same conceptual metaphors are
at work regardless of whether the expression is literal, colloquial, or
poetic. These metaphors are, so to speak, the unconscious rules of
our language-game. The persistence of this metaphoric system
through time (and, it turns out, space) and its ability to account for
semantic change, polysemy, and the synchronic production of new
usages (such as "airhead") indicate both that these metaphors are alive
and that they are a significant, entrenched part of the human concep-
tual system. 45 The consistency of this metaphoric system across genres
that are traditionally understood as separate (such as ordinary lan-
guage and poetry) suggests, moreover, that a common human ration-
ality is at work. Rather than saying that language is metaphoric all
the way down, it would be more apt to say that human rationality is
metaphoric through and through. 46 In contrast to the Nietzschean
and Romantic views of metaphor as the novel creation of unbridled
imagination, empirical evidence presents a picture of metaphor as a
systematic and orderly part of the cognitive process.
43 Id. at 345-46.
44 WALLACE STEVENS, An Ordinary Evening in New Haven, in THE COLLECTED POEMS,
supra note 6, at 465, 473. The claim that poetic metaphor is an extension of conventional
conceptual metaphor is developed more fully in GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE
THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR 67-72 (1989); and MARK TURNER,
READING MINDS: THE STUDY OF ENGLISH IN THE AGE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE (1991).
45 See SWEETSER, supra note 39, at 9 ("[C]ertain semantic changes occur over and over again
throughout the course of Indo-European and independently in different branches across an area
of thousands of miles and a time depth of thousands of years."). The striking consistency of
these phenomena cannot be accounted for as a contingency of cultural continuity. "There is
evidence that this metaphorical structure is not restricted to Indo-European . . . ." Id. at 22.
The reason for the consistency and the at least partially cross-cultural nature of these
metaphors is that they are grounded in basic human experience: Knowing Is Seeing and
Understanding Is Grasping are concepts that emerge from the species-wide experience of learning
about one's world through sight and touch. See generally Winter, supra note Io, at 1129-36,
1142-48 (discussing the nature of cognitive metaphor as grounded in experience) Anyone who
has watched an infant grasp an unfamiliar object and test it with her mouth should understand
why a metaphor such as Ideas Are Objects would have as a corollary the metaphor Ideas Are
Food. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 46-47 (I980) ("Now
there's a theory you can really sink your teeth into. . . . That's food for thought. He's a
voracious reader. We don't need to spoon-feed our students." (emphasis in original)).
46 It would be more precise, however, to include the analogical, the image-schematic, and
the metonymic and say that human rationality is imaginative through and through. See GEORGE
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE
MIND 153-54 (1987); MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON xiv-xvi (1987). Of course, the metaphors discussed in
the text are only a subset of the metaphors that are part of our conceptual system. See generally
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 45 (arguing that our conceptual system is based largely upon
metaphor).
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As a product of the same cognitive process, legal reasoning is no
less metaphoric. The Ideas Are Objects metaphor, for example, ap-
pears in conventional legal conceptions such as "findings of fact," the
"holding of a case," and the "marketplace of ideas. '47 The metaphoric
dimension of legal reasoning extends beyond these obvious examples
and includes such basic legal concepts as rules, rights, procedure, and
"Law" itself.48 For example, rules and rights are conceptualized as
paths that constrain legally appropriate actions: hence such familiar
phrases as "following the rules laid down" and "within the bounds of
the law."'4 9 No wonder, as Radin reminds us, "there can be no bright
line between law and not-law."3 0 Ostensibly separate categories such
as language, poetry, and law all have a common grounding in the
cognitive process.
IV. RELATION APPEARS
In contrast to the standard dichotomies, which risk the epochi, a
sophisticated understanding of the importance of metaphor suggests
an alternative that is "not a choice / Between excluding things ...
[N]ot a choice / Between, but of."5 1 Stevens provides a clue to that
alternative:
After all the pretty contrast of life and death
Proves that these opposite things partake of one,
At least that was the theory, when bishops' books
Resolved the world. We cannot go back to that.
The squirming facts exceed the squamous mind,
If one may say so. And yet relation appears,
A small relation expanding like the shade
Of a cloud on sand, a shape on the side of a hill.
5 2
Here Stevens suggests that the mind that understands everything in
dichotomous terms is a reptilian mind: too covered with squamae
(epidermal scales), too far down the evolutionary scale to succeed in
its task of understanding a squirming world of contingency and flux.
"And yet," Stevens tells us, "relation appears."
47 For a more complete discussion of this conventional metaphoric subsystem and its very
different elaboration by Milton and Holmes, see Winter, supra note io, at i189-9x.
4S Id. at 12o6-24 (discussing the Object and personification metaphors that constitute our
conceptions of "Law").
4, Id. at 1214, 1216.
SO Radin, supra note 5, at 265.
51 STEVENS, supra note 38, at 403.
-2 WALLACE STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 6, at
215, 215 (emphasis added).
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Metaphor is not a process of "too easy synthesis" (p. 77), but rather
of relation. It is the everyday means by which we do hold two things
in mind without either excluding one or conflating both. When we
conceive of understanding as grasping, for example, we gain a sense
of "grasp" as a cognitive operation without losing or supplanting its
physical meaning. At the same time, we do not diminish understand-
ing to mere grasping; metaphor is not a reductive function that equates
two separate domains, but a projection and expansion of one onto the
other. It is, in Stevens's words, "[a] small relation expanding like the
shade/ Of a cloud on sand," which is why Stevens can get "half colors"
from "quarter-things."5 3
Metaphor is the imaginative capacity by which we relate one thing
to another and, in so doing, "have" a world. Understanding is not
grasping, but conceiving it that way enables us to use all of the
entailments of the experience of grasping to structure operations in
the intellectual domain. To "take" an idea and "make it one's own"
is to achieve true understanding, but if a point "continues to elude
me," then I never really "had" it to begin with; if an idea is contested,
then it will be "up for grabs." In this way, conceptual metaphors
such as Ideas Are Objects and Understanding Is Grasping provide a
versatile repertoire for handling our day-to-day interactions.
These metaphors, moreover, can combine with other conceptual
metaphors to encompass entailments not embraced by the Object met-
aphor. For example, the Ideas Are Objects and Understanding Is
Grasping metaphors seem to imply both that knowledge is inert and
that, once acquired, it remains a static and unchanging asset. But
we also use the general Mind-As-Body metaphor to conceive cognitive
operations in terms of vision and movement.5 4 " These metaphoric
conceptions capture some of the dynamic quality of intellectual pro-
cesses. By using both sets of metaphors, we are able to re-present
these cognitive activities without the reductivism that might follow
53 STEVENS, supra note 31, at 288 ("[Y]ou were happy in spring, / With the half colors of
quarter-things .... .
54
[L]ogical structures and conversational structures are at least partly understood in terms
of physical traveling and motion. An argument or a conversation follows or covers some
particular path through the mental areas it traverses. Thus we say "That was off the
track of the argument," "The professor guided his students through the maze of tax law,"
"They didn't let him get very far into the subject," or "Where were we?"
SWEETSER, supra note 39, at 46. This metaphoric subsystem can be represented by the meta-
phors Knowing Is Seeing, Intellectual Investigation Is Exploration, and An Argument Is a
Journey. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 45, at 87-96. These metaphors are what enable
words that mean "path" to come to mean "however." Thus, we have anyway in English (as in:
"Any way you construct the argument, it always comes out .... ") and tuttavia in Italian
(literally "all road"). See SWEETSER, supra note 39, at 28, 46.
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from reliance on any single metaphor.5 5 This flexibility of metaphoric
thought enables us to function better in and adapt more successfully
to a "squirming" world of contingency and flux; it enables behaviors
and adaptations that would not be possible if we tried to pin the
world down with literal speech that strives for direct correspondence.
Armed with this understanding, we can see why metaphor is
nevertheless thought to be distorting. Because conceptual metaphor
is cognitively entrenched and operates without reflection, reductionism
comes easily; we may come to think that understanding really does
have all the entailments of grasping. Thus, if for us, Understanding
Is Grasping and Ideas Are Objects, we may come to see the world as
composed of discrete, mind-independent bits of reality (the objectivist
fallacy) or to treat abstract ideas as if they were somehow concrete
and real (the fallacy of reification). Both are errors of conflation, in
which we mistake one of many possible relations for an identity or
equation.
We can avoid these mistakes by attending to metaphor as a cog-
nitive function - that is, as the imaginative means by which we
conceive the multiple relations of a complex world. In that event, we
will no longer ask what metaphor "obscures" as if there were some
determinate reality "behind" the metaphor. Rather, the renunciation
of the traditional opposition between metaphor and reality allows us
to recognize that metaphors are our way of having a reality and,
therefore, that the important question about any metaphor is, which
(partial) reality does it enable? "[W]hat is at issue is not the truth or
falsity of a metaphor but the perceptions and inferences that follow
from it and the actions that are sanctioned by it."56 It is this prag-
matic attention to the relations created by our metaphors, and not
some mysterious faculty like "judgment,"5 7 that allows us to avoid the
use of metaphor to mask oppression.5 8
55 For an illustration of how this layering of metaphor can expand our understanding in the
context of a jurisprudential debate, see Winter, supra note 13, at 681-84.
56 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 45, at i58.
57 See supra pp. 751, 753.
56 Thus, before Radin puts the blame on "objectionable metaphor," Radin, supra note 5, at
262, she is nearly right:
Some men see young women "as" provocative. Some whites see young blacks "as"
menacing. This seeing is just as "really there" for the beholder as any hard fact or object.
Yet, because of the struggles of the oppressed, we are coming to understand that it is a
seeing that must be questioned.
Id. at 261. Perhaps we could come to this understanding sooner and with less struggle if we
attended to our metaphors, instead of just dismissing metaphor (or some metaphors) as "objec-
tionable." In an excellent and insightful analysis, George Lakoff has shown how the conventional
metaphors for sexuality structure this perception of women "as" provocative. See LAKOFF, supra
note 46, at 409-15.
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In this light, we might reconsider Stevens's aphorism from the
Adagia: "Reality is a clich6 from which we escape by metaphor. '5 9
We could read this to say both that reality and metaphor are separate
things and that the former is the state of stasis that precedes the
movement of the latter. But this reading ignores the full import of
"clich6," which connotes the conventional quality of reality as well as
its triteness. A more plausible interpretation would equate Stevens's
aphorism with the Nietzschean view that reality (like literality) is a
clich6 or dead metaphor. Grey appears to adopt this reading in the
epigraph juxtaposing this aphorism, which celebrates metaphor as
escape from cliche, with the lines from Credences of Summer that
condemn metaphor as evasion of reality.60 Grey then expands this
reading, however. He suggests that the aphorism
is, on its face, an assertion of romantic idealism; metaphor leads us
from a boring lifeless reality into the vital world of the imagined. But
cliches are not always dull truths - sometimes they are falsehoods,
unexamined conventional wisdom, part of the "stubborn, man-locked
set" of built-up prejudice and error that hides from the mind the world
as it really is (p. 71).61
Yet even this more nuanced, dialectical interpretation - in which
metaphor takes us both away from "reality" and toward it - is
problematically objectivist, for it reasserts a separation between the
mind's products and the world as it "really" is.
As we saw earlier, neither Stevens nor Grey progresses much
beyond the traditional dualisms of matter and mind, reality and imag-
ination, the literal and the metaphoric. 62 In contrast, I want to offer
a reading of the "Reality is a clich&' aphorism that draws upon our
earlier discussion of cognitive metaphor to take us beyond the reality/
imagination dichotomy, not by "a dialectical integration or synthesis"
or by "the acceptance of an unresolved dialogic oscillation between
them" (pp. 69-70), but by a deconstruction of that very dichotomy.
Elsewhere in the Adagia, Stevens seems to endorse the Nietzschean
view: "Metaphor creates a new reality from which the original appears
to be unreal. '63 But then he appears to reject it: "There is no such
thing as a metaphor of a metaphor. One does not progress through
metaphors. Thus reality is the indispensable element of each meta-
phor." 64 Consider how these two aphorisms modify our understanding
59 STEVENS, supra note 29, at 204.
60 See supra p. 750.
61 Grey quotes WALLACE STEVENS, Angel Surrounded by Paysans, in THE COLLECTED
POEMS, supra note 6, at 496, 497.
62 See supra pp. 747-48, 752-53.
63 STEVENS, supra note 29, at 195.
64 Id. at 204; see also WALLACE STEVENS, Responses to Partisan Review Questionnaire
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of the "Reality is a clich6" dictum. Taken together, these adages work
to collapse the dichotomy. Metaphor is contingent on reality. But
reality, Stevens says, is only a clich6 - a "stiff and stubborn, man-
locked set" of conceptions. 65 From this vantage point, metaphor ap-
pears as the imaginative means of escape to a "new" reality. Once
we are ensconced in that new perspective, however, the former reality
will no longer seem merely a clich6; it will seem unreal and false.66
But that can be possible only if the new "reality" is already taken for
granted as reality - that is, if it has already become a clich6. We
have come full circle. There is no difference between "cliche" and
"metaphor." Both are conventional ways of having a reality.
Read this way, Stevens's aphorisms presage Kuhn's insight that
reality itself is paradigm-dependent. 6 7 But this understanding means
that it is useless to think of clich6 as "false," for it can be no less true
(and no more false) than the metaphor. To think of clich6 or metaphor
as "false" - or, as Grey suggests, as something "that hides from the
mind the world as it really is" (p. 71) - is already to commit the
objectivist fallacy, because it necessarily posits some other access to a
world as it really is. By the same token, it would be a mistake to
understand the "Reality is a clich6" aphorism as suggesting that "met-
aphor" is epistemically superior to "clich6." Metaphor, too, is a con-
tingent relation, because "reality is the indispensable element of each
metaphor. '68 Taken together, Stevens's aphorisms say that, whether
called "clich" or "metaphor," imagination is our way of having a
reality. Thus, the difference between metaphor and clich6 cannot be
the difference between true and false, new and old, better or worse,
creative or conventional, but only a difference in our understanding
of the status of our conceptions. Both metaphor and clich6 are the
world as it is enabled through our conceptions of and interactions
with it.
(1939), in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 20, at 308, 309 ("The material of the imagination is
reality and reality can be nothing else except the usable past.").
65 STEVENS, supra note 61, at 497.
66 As Grey notes: "The postmodernism of writers like Clifford Geertz and Richard Rorty
(which has roots in Nietzsche and William James) strikes many today with the force of revelation;
its converts often treat their former realist or idealist absolutisms as false creeds to be aggressively
discarded" (p. 72).
67 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS II I-I (2d ed.
1970). This point is particularly clear when one compares the second aphorism - "Metaphor
creates a new reality from which the original appears to be unreal" - with Kuhn's description
of the perceptual changes that accompany a paradigm shift:
Looking at the moon, the convert to Copernicanism does not say, "I used to see a planet,
but now I see a satellite." That locution would imply a sense in which the Ptolemaic
system had once been correct. Instead, a convert to the new astronomy says, "I once
took the moon to be (or saw the moon as) a planet, but I was mistaken."
Id. at 115.
63 STEVENS, supra note 29, at 204.
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This reading, in which both "clich" and "metaphor" denote our
imaginative way of having a reality, is especially harmonious with our
earlier exploration of everyday language. The "literal" consists largely
of metaphors that are not recognized as such - not because they are
"dead," but because they are conventional and, hence, cliched. 69 Con-
versely, what we take to be original poetic metaphor - such as
Stevens's observation that "everything we say . . . [is] a cast / Of the
imagination, made in sound"70 - is just a novel instantiation of a
conventional, conceptual metaphor. This is why, on a more careful
reading, Grey finds metaphor even at the heart of the "real" as it is
portrayed in the second half of The Motive for Metaphor. The "stiff
and stubborn, man-locked set"71 of imaginative constructions is re-
markably resilient, in part because of its grounding in everyday
experience 72 and in part because of its marvelous flexibility and ge-
nerativity.
I do not claim that Stevens would have put it this way. Although
he continued to question it, Stevens never quite escaped the dichotom-
ization of mind and world, realism and idealism, truth and fiction.
Even in his essay on the integration of the poetic and the philosophic,
Stevens maintained that "[i]f the philosopher's world is this present
world plus thought, then the poet's world is this present world plus
imagination." 73 Here Stevens not only separates the "present world"
from what is added by the mind, but also divides the workings of the
mind into the philosopher's "thought" and the poet's "imagination."
Stevens's residual dualism is also apparent in another part of the
Adagia, where he proclaims: "The final belief is to believe in a fiction,
which you know to be a fiction, there being nothing else. The ex-
quisite truth is to know that it is a fiction and that you believe in it
willingly. ' 74 It is true, as Grey points out, that "'[f]iction' is a crucially
multivocal term for Stevens; it connotes falsity to the realist, the
heightened reality of creative invention to the idealist, and 'madeness'
or social construction to the perspectivist" (p. 76). And in one sense,
Stevens is correct: one must "believe in a fiction" because one's world
is a construction and not a mind-independent reality. Even so, Ste-
vens's choice of the term "fiction" represents a failure of pragmatist
conviction. To recognize that everything is socially constructed is not
69 As Grey notes: "This working of the imagination through everyday life is generally invisible
to people within their own culture, for whom it forms their reality or 'life-world"' (p. 72).
70 STEVENS, supra note 42, at 345-46.
71 STEVENS, supra note 61, at 497.
72 Thus, Stevens not only recognizes that "reality is the indispensable element of each
metaphor," but goes further and claims that "[a]ll of our ideas come from the natural world:
trees = umbrellas." STEVENS, su1pra note 29, at 189, 204.
73 STEVENS, supra note 20, at 278. His idea of integration consisted in cases "in which the
reason and the imagination have been acting in concert." Id. at 279.
74 STEVENS, supra note 29, at i89.
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to believe in a "fiction." Our constructions are no less real (and no
more fictive) because they are our constructions.75 For the pragmatist,
constructions may be useful or not; they may be harmful or not; they
will enable some things and exclude others.76 For the pragmatist,
however, they can never be "false" in any but this relative sense.
Certainly they cannot be false solely due to their constructed character.
Thus, Radin is correct when she reminds us that "'[a]fter the final
no there comes a yes / And on that yes the future world depends."' 77
Without that "yes," there would be no constructions to provide us
with the categories and ways of understanding that enable us to "have"
a world. Law is one such construction; it furnishes us with concepts,
procedures, and methods of argumentation that enable us consciously
to adjust conflicts in social interactions. 78 It does not follow, however,
that our current set of legal concepts and categories is any good.
Indeed, one of the inarticulate premises of Grey's thesis is that our
current set of legal constructions is afflicted by the inevitable conse-
quences of dichotomization. In the opposition of law and equity (pp.
87-90) or rules and standards, 79 we experience again and again "the
familiar oscillation of strict and equitable legal theories" (p. 87). Grey
does not suggest that Stevens's poetry offers any remedy for these
tensions and their resulting fluctuations. He suggests only that it can
help reveal "the inability of law's language to encompass the world it
would regulate" and the need to assert both sides of these oppositions
(p. 65).
But is there any other way? Can we construct legal concepts and
categories that do not rely on oppositions and dichotomies? This is
not the place for an extended examination of the reconstructive po-
tential of metaphor in law, a task I have undertaken elsewhere.8 0 In
this essay, I have tried to establish one thing: we cannot proceed
beyond the epochi until we abandon the traditional opposition be-
tween metaphor and reality, until we reconcile poetry with law, until
we integrate imagination with rationality.
75 See Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (199o) ("[W]e need an epistemological understanding that allows us to
recognize the constructed nature of meaning without renouncing what is valuable in those
constructions.").
76 As Grey notes: "World-views take their character from what they exclude and emphasize
as well as what they assert" (p. 74).
77 Radin, supra note 5, at 265 (quoting WALLACE STEVENS, The Well Dressed Man with a
Beard, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 6, at 247, 247).
78 Cf. id. at 266 ("We must have some procedures, some categories, some everyday under-
standings of which things are close to the center of the map .... ")
7" See Duncan Kennedy, Forn and Substance in Privato Law Adjudication, S9 HARv. L.
REV. 1685, 687-89, 1737-51, 1776-78 (1976).
,o See Winter. supra note io, at 1107-14, 1142-1224; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, I382-92, 1491-1503
(1988).
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Conventional legal reasoning is relentlessly reductive: it imposes
propositional rules and other necessary and sufficient criteria for de-
cisionmaking upon a much more complex human reality. By drawing
distinctions, we try to clarify the law and render it more precise. But
the squirming world of contingency and flux is not so easily domes-
ticated. The indeterminacy that has come to be such a contemporary
crisis is, at least in part, the result of this conflict between human
complexity and procrustean rationality.8 l The by-product of this dis-
parity is an excess that must always be accommodated by some murky
residual category like equitable discretion, intuitive judgment, or prac-
tical wisdom - the kinds of ineffables that are all the rage in the
legal academy today.8 2
Stevens's examination of metaphor can be read to provide more
help than Grey suggests. A close reading of the Adagia indicates that
metaphor is our way of "having" a reality. It is the imaginative
capacity by which we relate one thing to another without reductive
equation. Moreover, the flexibility of metaphorical thought - the
capacity to combine metaphors (such as Understanding Is Grasping
and Intellectual Investigation Is Exploration) to capture different as-
pects of our experience - enables us to accommodate complexity in
ways that rules and other dichotomous conceptual structures cannot.8 3
Self-reflective awareness of our metaphors can facilitate more prag-
matic attention to the realities that these metaphors enable. Con-
versely, the unreflective use of metaphor can lead us to take "reality"
for granted - that is, as a clich6. Thus, the failure to apprehend the
metaphorical nature of our reasoning can leave us vulnerable to errors
of conflation, objectification, and reification that, in turn, can yield
dire consequences. As I explore in the next Part, it is precisely in this
way that metaphor may mask oppression.
V. SENSE AND SELVES
Grey reads Stevens to say that when we have reduced a complex
human experience to a set of legal distinctions, we are left with the
epochi - "that something, which may be the most important thing,
[which] always remains obscure" (p. 66). In contrast, I claim that
Stevens should be read as rejecting the very possibility of achieving
the reduction of human reality to a set of determinate criteria. This
becomes clear upon reading Stevens's poem An Ordinary Evening in
New Haven, which, as Grey explains, is "an experiment in how far
poetry can pursue the reductive realist spirit" (p. 77). The physical
si See Winter, supra note io, at 1195-98.
82 See Schlag, supra note ii, at x657-64.
83 For an example within legal doctrine, see Winter, supra note 8o, at 1491-1503.
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forms of New Haven represent the reality of the object-realm. But
they do not tell the whole story:
If, then, New Haven is half sun, what remains,
At evening, after dark, is the other half,
Lighted by space, big over those that sleep,
Of the single future of night, the single sleep,
As of a long, inevitable sound,
A kind of cozening and coaxing sound,
And the goodness of lying in a maternal sound,
Unfretted by day's separate, several selves,
Being part of everything come together as one. s 4
Stevens offers us not only the antithesis of harsh reality ("If, then,
New Haven is half sun") and soft, moonlit ("Lighted by space, big
over those that sleep") sentiment ("the goodness of lying in a maternal
sound"), but also a promise of synthesis ("the single future of night,
the single sleep / . . . Being part of everything come together as
one").
Stevens, however, is not so romantic as to expect that unity.
Rather, he tells us that reduction produces a ghostly excess.
The town was a residuum,
A neuter shedding shapes in an absolute.
Yet the transcripts of it when it was blue remain;
And the shapes that it took in feeling, the persons that
It became, the nameless, flitting characters -
These actors still walk in a twilight muttering lines.8 5
The objectivist rejection of metaphor ("A neuter shedding shapes in
an absolute") will always fail to achieve the desired reduction. In-
stead, "the transcripts of it when it was blue remain." Here, Stevens
recalls for us The Man with the Blue Guitar, in which he advised
that "Nothing must stand / Between you and the shapes you take. '8 6
The procrustean attempt at reduction notwithstanding, the metaphoric
"shapes that it took in feeling . . . still walk in a twilight muttering
lines." We can reduce a living dispute to a case at law, but that
reduction is never completely successful, and its consequences remain
to haunt us.
Because we understand abstract concepts by means of the Ideas
Are Objects metaphor, the vector of reduction runs in the opposite
84 STEVENS, supra note 44, at 482.
I id. at 479.
6 WALLACE STEVENS, The Man with the Blue Guitar, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra
note 6, at 165, 183.
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direction from abstraction to reification: the reduction of an idea to a
thing. This process of "thingification" conflates one of many possible
relations into an identity or equation. When we reduce the many
possible relations that are an actual person to a unitary legal thing,8 7
the consequence is not "that something, which may be the most im-
portant thing, always remains obscure" (p. 66). To the contrary, the
effect of that "thingification" is a person made discrete, objectified,
and thus exposed:
It is as if
Men turning into things, as comedy,
Stood, dressed in antic symbols, to display
The truth about themselves, having lost, as things,
That power to conceal they had as men. .... 88
In this way, a legal distinction can reduce and reify a living person
and thereby introduce precisely the definition and control that enable
oppression. 89
Braswell v. United States90 is an example of just such an oppres-
sive reduction. In Braswell, the Supreme Court applied the "collective
entity" doctrine to hold that the custodian of corporate records could
not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to resist a subpoena to produce corporate documents. 91 The Court
reasoned:
[T]he custodian of corporate or entity records holds those documents
in a representative rather than a personal capacity .... Under those
circumstances, the custodian's act of production is not deemed a per-
sonal act, but rather an act of the corporation. Any claim of Fifth
Amendment privilege asserted by the agent would be tantamount to
a claim of privilege by the corporation - which of course possesses
no such privilege. 92
There was a problem, however, that made the invocation of the
distinction between the "custodian's" corporate and personal capacities
particularly difficult and peculiarly oppressive in this case. Braswell,
the corporate president and custodian of the records, was also the sole
shareholder. 93 To the extent that his act of production was incrimi-
nating, it could incriminate no one but himself. 94
87 On the interactional complexity of the "self," see Winter, supra note 18, at 983-91.
85 STEVENS, supra note 44, at 470.
89 Cf. Radin, supra note 5, at 262 (arguing that "the obscurity of metaphor provides comfort
to oppression").
90 487 U.S. 99 (r988).
91 See id. at io8-o9, 889.
92 Id. at o9-io.
93 See id. at ioI.
94 See id. at 120 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia, JJ.).
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Cases such as Braswell exemplify the clash between the complexity
of human experience and the dichotomous, reductive practice of legal
reasoning. 95 An actual person cannot be segmented neatly into dif-
ferent "capacities" like public and private or corporate and personal.
Thus "dressed in antic symbols," 96 real people become only personae
- "nameless, flitting characters" 9 7 without the right to invoke the
constitutional privilege afforded a natural person: "Men turning into
things . . . having lost as things, / That power to conceal they had
as men." 98
At the same time, Braswell's reality as a person could not be
ignored. As Stevens says, "the persons that I It became ... still walk
in a twilight muttering lines." 99 Even the Court could not help but
notice the peculiar situation it had produced: by splitting Braswell's
selves, the Court made it possible for evidence of Braswell's produc-
tion qua custodian to be used against Braswell in his personal capacity
as defendant. The Court responded by drawing another distinction,
this time between the permissible evidentiary uses of Braswell's act
of production. It recognized a shadowy, phantom privilege prohibiting
the government from introducing "into evidence before the jury the
fact that the subpoena was served upon and the corporation's docu-
ments were delivered by one particular individual, the custodian."1 0 0
But this did not solve the problem at all; the artificiality of the Court's
first distinction merely spawned another, even more absurd distinc-
tion.1 0 1 Limiting instructions notwithstanding, a jury would surely
figure out that Braswell - as the corporate president, custodian of
the records, and sole shareholder - was the only person who could
have delivered the documents. 102
95 One might think that the doctrine applied in Braswell could be explained as a necessary
corollary to the fiction of the corporate form - piercing the veil neither for the corporation nor
for its agents. But the Court applies the collective entity doctrine to legal partnerships and
labor unions as well. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944). Moreover, the reasoning of Braswell - separating, for
constitutional purposes, the role of custodian from the person who occupies it - has since been
extended in a particularly pernicious way to the family law context. See Baltimore City Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549. 563-64 (199o) (holding a mother in contempt for
failing to produce her child or disclose his whereabouts even though the state admitted the child
was probably dead and that, therefore, any disclosure would be incriminating).
96 STEVENS, supra note 44, at 470.
97 Id. at 479.
9s Id. at 470.
'9 Id. at 479.
1o Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 'S (1988).
101 For an excellent diagnosis, discussion, and deconstruction of this phenomenon of "split
proliferation," see Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal
Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REv. 929, 942-44 (988).
102 Although Braswell's wife and mother were corporate officers and directors, neither had
any control over the corporation. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at i. Worse yet, the justification
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The Court's predicament in Braswell was not a consequence of a
failure to use metaphor; it could not avoid doing so. In segmenting
a person into different roles, the Court employed a conventional met-
aphor that conceives states as locations or containers.10 3 Thus, it is
conventional to speak of a person as "occupying" a role or as being
"within the role's domain. 10 4 Indeed, for the Court, the case turned
on the "fact"'05 that "the custodian of corporate or entity records holds
those documents in a representative rather than a personal capac-
ity."106
Rather, the Court's predicament was a consequence of its un-
reflective use of metaphor.10 7 Instead of treating Braswell "as" a
custodian (and still a person protected by the privilege), it reified the
metaphoric conception that Roles Are Containers and treated Braswell
as acting "in a representative capacity." Only in this way could it
plausibly treat the custodial role as if it were some thing entirely
separate from the natural person who would be entitled to invoke the
privilege. At the same time, the Court employed the metaphor re-
ductively - treating the role as coextensive with the person while he
or she "occupies" it. For the Court, "certain consequences flow from
the fact that the custodian's act of production is one in his represent-
ative rather than personal capacity."108 This reduction allowed the
Court to treat Braswell's act of production as the act of a custodian
only, having nothing to do with Braswell as a person protected by
the privilege against self-incrimination.
All this is the most pernicious form of legal fiction. A role is not
a unitary "thing," but a pattern of conduct performed by an actual
for the Court's phantom privilege fatally undermines the rationale of the collective entity
doctrine. As explained by the dissent:
the majority impinges on its own analysis by concluding that, while the Government
may compel a named individual to produce records, in any later proceeding against the
person it cannot divulge that he performed the act. But if that is so, it is because the
Fifth Amendment protects the person without regard to his status as a corporate em-
ployee. Once this be admitted, the necessary support for the majority's case has collapsed.
Id. at 128 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia, JJ.).
103 See George Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT
(Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. forthcoming 1992). These metaphors motivate expressions like "she
is a lawyer in full-time practice, but she's on vacation right now." The States Are Containers
metaphor applies to mental states and motivates expressions like "she's deep in thought" and
"he's in a foul mood."
104 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Law, Community, and Communication, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1654,
1654-57.
105 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117-18.
106 Id. at io9-io (emphasis added). "Capacity" means both content (as in "what's your
library's capacity?") and power or ability (as in "he has a tremendous capacity for hard work").
In the latter example, capacity is an instantiation of the States Are Containers metaphor. Like
"perceive," the word "capacity" derives from the latin capere which means "to take [in]."
107 See Winter, supra note i8, at 983-84.
10 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117-18 (emphasis added).
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person. By failing to apprehend the metaphorical nature of its rea-
soning, the Court succumbed to errors of conflation, objectification,
and reification. Braswell demonstrates how important it is to avoid
mistaking the metaphorical quality of reason; it illustrates how inat-
tention to metaphor in law can mask oppression.
VI. THE INTIMATION OF CHANGES
In arguing for recognition of the irreducibly imaginative and met-
aphoric nature of reason and its importance to law, I have been
arguing as well for a particular understanding of what it means to be
human. The obsession of the law is control; the reality of human life
is change and adaptation. The relentless binarism of standard legal
thought is a way to define things and pin them down; metaphor is
the way in which we humans express relation without reduction. We
have seen how metaphor is at the heart of the "real" because it is our
way of world-making, our mode of engagement. This, I suggest, is
the profound message of The Motive for Metaphor that appears when
we read it free from "the habitual and institutional rigidities of binary
thought" (p. 7).
In their readings of the poem, both Grey and Radin take the line
"Steel against intimation" to state an antithesis: steel versus intimation,
law versus literature, reality versus poetry, literality versus metaphor.
This opposition of steel to intimation is central to every one of Grey's
readings.1 0 9 Yet Grey finds it difficult to explain "th[is] most opaque
of the metaphors in Stevens's poem" (p. 66). He notes that nothing
in the forge images surrounding this phrase corresponds to "intima-
tion" (pp. 66-67). This observation leads Grey to consider two law-
related interpretations. First, he recounts Helen Vendler's suggestion
that "Steel against intimation" is the "executioner's blade against the
flesh" - although he points out that this reading does not conform to
the forge imagery of the rest of the stanza (p. 67). Second, he inverts
the referents and suggests that steel may be the object of intimation
- that "the intimating and metaphorizing imagination heats and soft-
ens the steel of an impersonal rule of law" (p. 67). Thus, for Grey,
"'[s]teel against intimation' . . . juxtaposes two aspects of law: its
sharp rigidity . . . and its flexibility before the imagination" (p. 67).
There may, however, be a less binary, more profound reading.
What if "steel against intimation" describes a mental state, where
"steel" is a verb as in "[to] steel [oneself] against intimation?" If so,
Grey must surely be committing the fallacy of reification when he
Io At one point, Grey invokes the very obscurity of this metaphor to substantiate his
dialectical interpretation in which metaphor reveals the incompleteness of law's language (pp.
6o-65).
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looks for some "concrete referent" for "intimation" (p. 137 n.39). If
"steel" describes a mental state, its counterbalance should be an idea
or conception. The "intimation" we are to steel ourselves against,
then, is "intimation" as the hint of the unspeakable, unarticulable,
and the feared - the intimation of mortality. In that event, the
motive for metaphor has everything to do with the "fatal, dominant
X." Read this way, the poem is an internal dialogue on the subject
of the poet's own mortality and, by extension, our own.
On this reading, the poet is not "shrinking [away] from / The
weight of primary noon" by means of metaphor. Rather, he shrinks
under "It]he weight of primary noon," which is a heavy burden bearing
down on him. Metaphor is thus the poet's response to the weight of
primary noon. If primary noon is life (or real life, or the war), the
"weight of primary noon" is the burdens of life and most especially
the constant intimation of mortality. 1 10 The motive for metaphor is
the fear of death or, more precisely, the desire for life - "[d]esiring
the exhilarations of changes." To paraphrase Stevens: Death is the
mother of metaphor."'
The exhilaration of changes, then, is the product of metaphor
understood as an indispensable mode of engagement with life. ("De-
siring the exhilarations of changes: / The motive for metaphor.")
These exhilarations may take two forms: either the self-indulgent,
ennui-driven sort or the more constructive form symbolized by the
hammer of red and blue. We may infer, however, that these construc-
tive diversions are "primary" for Stevens; in the first half of the poem,
he seems to deprecate "the half colors of quarter-things" and the
incompleteness that, later in the poem, calls out to be expressed in
the primary colors of red and blue. Thus, the forge imagery of the
final stanza represents the poet's workplace; the hammer and anvil
are the tools of the wordsmith who hammers out the metaphors with
which he will steel himself against the intimation of death.112
This interpretation completes Grey's search for a referent for "in-
timation" in the first part of the poem (p. 137 n.39). As Grey notes,
1tO This reading more firmly connects this poem, in Stevens's wartime volume, see WALLACE
STEVENS, TRANSPORT TO SUMMER (I947), to the carnage around it. As Grey points out, Stevens
was concerned that his wartime poetry was marginal to the war effort; he longed to offer
inspiration or consolation to his fellow citizens (pp. 56-58).
III See WALLACE STEVENS, Sunday Morning, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 6, at
66, 69 ("Death is the mother of beauty, mystical, / Within whose burning bosom we devise /
Our earthly mothers waiting, sleeplessly."). For a careful study of the cognitive source and
systematic poetic usage of such kinship metaphors for causation, see MARK TURNER, DEATH IS
THE MOTHER OF BEAUTY: MIND, METAPHOR, CRITICISM (1987).
112 This reading is consistent with Cook's suggestion that Stevens is meditating on the theme
of the drive for poetry itself. See ELEANOR COOK, POETRY, WORD-PLAY, AND WORD-WAR IN
WALLACE STEVENS 182-84 (1988). Grey also discusses this interpretation (p. 135 n.ig). In
another, lengthy footnote, he catalogues a series of alternative readings, including my own (p.
137 n.39).
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the metaphors of spring and autumn that Stevens invokes in the
opening stanzas are "so familiar as to pass almost unnoticed" (p. 135
n.21). But they are crucial to the poem; by invoking such highly
conventional metaphors, Stevens plainly fixes mortality as the antag-
onist of the poem. In the opening stanzas, he uses Life Is a Year,
and in the final stanzas Life Is a Day.1 13 In the autumn of life, when
the poet begins his reflections, he is at one with his world. In autumn,
everything is half dead like the poet, and he therefore has a measure
of peace with the world - a mortal world that he is of. The wind,
like him, moves as a cripple among the leaves and speaks the same
meaninglessness that is life viewed close-up against the background
of death.
In much the same way, the poet was happy in spring when every-
thing was still potential and yet did not need to be expressed, when
it was all right not to be oneself (that is, one's possibilities): "And
[you] did not want nor have to be." And yet, the ambiguous comma
on which the poem pivots suggests a cross-current: perhaps what was
good about the luxurious idleness of youth was that you "did not want
nor have to be [d]esiring the exhilarations of changes: the motive for
metaphor, . . . [t]he A B C of being, / The ruddy temper," all those
things with which, as mature adults, we steel ourselves against the
intimation of death and which, nevertheless, are an integral part of
death's logic - that is, "[tlhe A B C of being" that, in its inexorable
way, leads to the "fatal, dominant X." "The vital, arrogant, fatal,
dominant X" is Death, the ultimate unknown, the ultimate X. 114
Contrary to Grey's suggestions that "life ('vital') is set against death
('fatal')" (p. 60), Stevens here invokes the conventional poetic person-
ification of Death (as in "the Grim Reaper"). 1 15 Hence, it (the "X")
can be both vital and fatal, arrogant in the assurance of its triumph
and, thus, always dominant.
This reading of the poem also explains the curious structure of the
final stanza, which consists entirely of a series of appositives that
includes the crucial phrase, "Steel against intimation," set off by
dashes. If the phrase refers to the effort to stave off death, its form
repeats its substance: the rush of the successive appositive clauses runs
all the way from "[tihe A B C of being" to the "fatal, dominant X."
The dashes that surround the phrase "Steel against intimation" are an
obstruction or impediment intended to break the reader's surge
113 These and other conventional poetic metaphors - such as the Life Is a Journey metaphor
invoked by the reference to "the weight of primary noon" - are explored and developed at
length in LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 44.
114 Although Z would be neater, it would be less metaphorically coherent. X makes more
sense for "Death," for X is the unknown in every equation. Moreover, X calls up the image of
the skull and crossbones and suggests finality, as in "X marks the spot."
11s See LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 44, at 78-80.
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through to the inevitable end. Once the poet has obtained that pause,
suddenly - as Death is always sudden - appears "the sharp flash"
that breaks the train of life.
Finally, this interpretation coheres with Grey's dialectical reading
in which he notes "the poem's turn in the final stanzas toward meta-
phor, the obscure, the transitory, where we were led to expect the
literal, clear, and stable" (p. 6o). The "real" ("primary noon") turns
out to be metaphoric ("The ruddy temper, the hammer / Of red and
blue, the hard sound"), just as the poetic ("the obscure moon") was
paradoxically flat and literal ("You like it under the trees in autumn
/ Because everything is half dead."). 116 Metaphor is (once again) at
the heart of "real" life. It is the very drive for life: to express, to
make sense, to see the full colors ("the hammer / Of red and blue"),
the steel against the intimation of mortality. What the poem offers is
not a dichotomous formulation of reality versus metaphor, but the
relentless human construction that is the center (the "primary noon")
of life. As Stevens puts it in Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction:
There was a will to change, a necessitous
And present way, a presentation, a kind
Of volatile world, too constant to be denied,
The eye of a vagabond in metaphor
That catches our own. The casual is not
Enough. The freshness of transformation is
The freshness of a world. It is our own,
It is ourselves, the freshness of ourselves,
And that necessity and that presentation
Are rubbings of a glass in which we peer.
Of these beginnings, gay and green, propose
The suitable amours. Time will write them down. 117
116 As Grey explains, these opening lines of the poem "are unusually flat and literal for
Stevens, and ... the portrayal of spring in stanzas two and three is itself plain and relatively
unfigurative" (pp. 59-60).
117 STEVENS, supra note 38, at 397-98.
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